It was not a surprise that the urgent task which the ncw regime in Pctrograd set for itsclf vvas that of pcacc. Thc Russian pcoplc wcrc wcary of fighıing. After four years of war there was a vvidcsprcad cry for pcace among thc Russian population. Thc soldiers particularly wantcd to return to thcir homes. In Lenin's words, "the soldiers arc tircd out, thc soldiers are barcfootcd, thc soldiers arc starving, thc soldiers do not want to fight". 2 It is only logical in this context to understand vvhy in thc days prcccding the Novembcr Rcvolution thc Bolshcviks had promiscd pcacc. If pcacc was not forthcoming, if thousands of men were not returning home, it vvas obvious that Lenin's fate vvould not bc diffcrcnl from that of Alcxandcr Kcrcnsky (the last Prime Ministcr of thc Provisional Govcrnmcnt). It vvas thc provvar memorandum to submit to the French Premier Clemenceau. According to thc memorandum, to continuc regular contacts with thc Ukraine, thc Cossacks, Finland, Sibcria, and thc Caucasus vvould be ncccssary on both thc grounds of moral obligation and the strategic imporlance of these regions. 8 This memorandum vvas acccpted by Clcmenccau the next day and bccamc thc Anglo-Frcnch Convcnlion. 9 With this convcntion tvvo ccntral clcmcnts of thc Allicd policy vvere put forvvard: On the onc hand to prevent Gcrmany and its allies from obtaining rich matcrial sourccs (especially thc oil of Azcrbaijan and thc vvhcat of thc Ukraine) and on thc other to stop thc esealation of thc Turkish influcncc in thc region. It vvas cmphasiscd that a Pan-Turkic and Islamic cxpansion from Turkcy into thc hcart of thc Caucasus might have been even greater danger to thc pcacc of thc vvestern vvorld. 10 The sourcc of this conccrn about thc development of a Pan-Turkic movement "that vvill cxtcnd from Conslantinople to China" 11 vvas related to an inereasing fcar. The Ottoman govcrnmcnt cncouragcd by thc Bolshcviks' Dccree of Pcacc, vvas cxpccting to rccovcr most of its castcrn Anatolian and Transcaucasian lands, vvhich had been occupicd by thc Russian armies sincc thc Summcr of 1916. Thc Gcrman-Sovict negotiations providcd thc Ottoman govcrnmcnt an opportunity to put forvvard further claims in thc Caucasus vvhere a considcrablc Müslim populalion had alrcady becn stirred up by PanTurkic and Islamic scntimcnts. 12 Thc possibility of an imminent Turkish cxpansion in thc region presented "a new and a very real danger" to the British position in thc East. 13 In this vvay, thc Caucasus emerged as "thc most vital [arca] from the point of vicvv of British interests" 14 soon after thc Bolshcviks Rcvolution. Thc British Empirc had long considcrcd the region strategically vital to its povvcr in Pcrsia, Afghanistan and, most important of ali, in India. When thc 8 In Lloyd Goorgc, War Memoirs, II, pp. 1550-51. Bolsheviks proposcd an armisticc, thc anlicipation vvas thal thc rcgion vvould fail into chaos. This in turn vvould makc thc arca vulnerablc to thc influcnce of both Gcrman and Turkish armics vvho vvould not vvastc time to grab thc golden opportunity to put thc rcgion undcr thcir control.
With thc fear of losing thc stratcgic positions and the valuable natural resources of thc Caucasus to thc Central Povvcrs, thc British govcrnmcnt encouragcd thc Christian nations of thc rcgion to crcct a firm barricr. At the same time, they providcd material assistancc to the anti-Bolshcvik Russian armics. British agents and officcrs vvere sent in to advisc and support thc govcrnmcnts of Transcaucasia and anti-Bolshcvik armics.
15 Evcn if thc Bolsheviks had rcachcd a separate pcacc agrccmcnt vvith thc Central Povvcrs, thc Allicd-supported bloc vvas hoped to prevent thc fail of thc key routcs to thc Gcrman and Turkish povvers.
By thc end of thc ycar 1917, it appcarcd that thc fcar of thc British vvas not ill-foundcd. Ali thc indications from thc rcgion poinlcd to an immediate occupation of Transcaucasia by thc Oltoman armics in a fresh attempt to rcalisc thcir long-standing dream of unifying thc Turkic-spcaking Müslim pcoplcs of thc Caucasus, Transcaspia and Central Asia undcr thc Turkish banner.
The decision of thc nevv regime in Pctrograd to end thc hostilitics on thc fronts slrcngthcncd the expcclaiions of thc Turks. This providcd a real chancc for thc Turkish army to cxcrcisc its influcnce in thc rcgion vvithout any serious opposition. They vvere taking advantagc of thc disintegration of thc Russian Eastcrn front. General Ludcndorf, thc Dcputy Chicf of thc Gcrman General Staff, deseribes in his mcmoirs hovv thc Turks capturcd thc opportunity crcatcd by thc revolution in Russia to fiil thc rcsulling political and military vacuum in thc Caucasus as "thc predestined moment" for the realisation of ali thcir ambitious sehemes of cxpansion. 16 Enver Pasha, Ottoman War Minister and thc most-celebralcd champion of the Pan-Turkic cxpansion, had alrcady sent tvvo division from thc Galician and Moldovian fronts to thc Turkish-Russian border in thc cast during thc last ycar of thc vvar. Thc intention vvas to crcatc a sound military basc in thc Caucasus in case of an Allicd-occupation of Wcstcrn Turkcy. 24 A representative assembly, the Seim, vvas formcd vvith the participation of the representatives of Gcorgia, Armcnia and Azerbaijan. In April, 1918, the Seim proelaimed Transcaucasia an independent Dcmocratic Fcdcrativc Republic, and a cabinct vvas formcd vvilh execulive povvcrs. 25 The Seim did not recognise thc outeome of thc Brcst-Litovsk conference; in fact, it had attempted to enler separate negotiations vvith the Turks in Fcbruary vvhile the discussions vvere stili going on at BrcstLitovsk. 26 Incrcasing activities of thc Turks in thc rcgion accountcd for this decision. Thc Ottoman troops vvere conccntraling in largc numbers and Russia, one of thc most povvcrful of thc Allics in the rcgion, vvas already negotiating a humiliating pcacc vvith thc Central Povvcrs. Undcr these circumstances, it might have appeared to bc thc most rcalistic vvay to survive to come to terms vvith thc Turks. Tvvo days before thc conclusion of the Bresl-Litovsk trcaty, ihe Seim chosc a dclcgation to negotiatc wilh thc Turks in thc name of the Transcaucasian Assembly.
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Transcaucasian and Turkish delegations met at Trabzon, a southeastern Black Sca port, to discuss pcacc terms at a confcrcnce vvhich started on 14 March. 28 Whcn thc supplcmcntary Turkish-Russian agrccment to the trcaty of Brcst-Litovsk, which had alrcady ccded Batum, Kars and Ardahan to Turkcy, was put forvvard by thc Turkish dclcgation as a prccondition for thc talks, the negotiations cnlcrcd into a deadlock. Petrograd the Baku Bolsheviks did not follow suit and prcferrcd to pursue 'pcaceful transition' through the political struggle vvith thc local government.
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Baku, a tovvn vvith a population of 2500 at the beginning of the nineteenth century, emerged as an industrial and commcrcial centrc vvith a thriving population rising to 200,000 at thc end of the century. Thc rush to Baku vvas driven by the discovery of rich oil resources. Whcn thc oil vvells in Baku started producing the black gold, Tsarist Russia had begun exporting petrolcüm instead of importing it. Railvvays soon follovvcd to transport thc material vvcalth to and from. Thc Batum-Baku railvvay construction opencd thc vvay for a big harbour and, conscqucntly, Baku vvas by 1918 al thc centrc of ever important transit routc bctvvcen Russia, Iran and Central Asia via thc Caspian sea.
The population of Baku consistcd of three majör nalionalitiesAzerbaijanis, Russians and Armcnians, Each cthnic group had its ovvn political organisation. Thc Armcnians ccntrcd around thc Dashnaktsutiun, a 'socialist' party vvith a strong emphasis upon Armcnian national unity; thc majority of thc Azerbaijanis developed somc loyalty to thc sccular national ist Müsavat Party; and the Russians vvere elose to thc SRP (Socialist Rcvolutionarics) and thc Mensheviks. Hovvcvcr, there vvas a rising sympathy tovvards thc Bolsheviks since thc March Revolution. Thc real issuc in Baku vvas thc danger of an cthnic vvar bctvvcen thc Armcnian and thc Müslim communitics.
When thc Caucasian front disintegrated complctcly follovving the Bolshcvik Dccrcc of Pcacc, there remaincd virtually no army of vvhich thc Baku Soviet could rely on. As a rcsult, an uncasy coopcration emerged betvvcen thc Bolsheviks and thc Armcnian Dashnaktsutiun. Thc Bolsheviks had no choice but to rely on thc volunteer units of the Armcnians. This nevv development incrcascd thc ethnic and rcligious hostilities and further alicnatcd the Müslim community in Baku. This episode is deseribed in Sovict historiography as "thc victory of revolutionary forccs" against thc "countcr-rcvolutionary forccs" of the Musavatists, thc Dashnaks, thc SRs and the Mcnsheviks. Thc Armenian support in thc Baku Bolshcviks' fighl against thc Muslims vvas hastily svvept aside in order to justify thc incidcnt in terms of a "elass strugglc" betvveen "Transcaucasia's vvorking elass, and abovc ali, its vanguard, the Baku prolelariat" and the "Azcrbaijanian bourgcois-gcntry circlcs". 34 Thc March event in Baku bccamc thc first tragic incidcnt in vvhich thc Bolsheviks soughı thc support of onc cthnic povvcr against anothcr to strcngthcn thcir position in thc region. Follovving thc end of thc battlc, the Bolsheviks hurricdly startcd to consolidatc thcir gains. Wilh thc Müslim povvcr tragically cut and thc Armcnians vvcakcncd by the battlc, there vvas no one to opposc thc full monopoly of povvcr by thc Bolshcviks. Thcy absorbcd part of thc Armcnian troops into the Baku Red Army, disbandcd the rest, and elosed ali opposition partics and papers. 35 Thc Batum confcrencc started in early vveeks of May. At thc confcrcncc thc Ottoman delegation presented a draft Ircaty vvhich demanded from thc Tiflis gubcrniia, the Akhalkalak and Akhaltsikh uezds and from thc Erevan gubcrniia, thc entire Sürmeli uezd along vvith part of the Alexandropol and Etchmiadzin uezds through vvhich thc Kars-Julfa railroad passed. 39 In addition to tlıcse, nevv substantial privilegcs on trade and navigation, frontier traffic, full Ottoman transit rights through Transcaucasia, and a sharp reduetion of thc armcd forccs of thc Transcaucasian govcrnment in Tiflis, vvere demanded. 40 There sccmed nothing to prevent the Turks to put thc vvhole rcgion under thcir control. The Azerbaijani Muslims vvere opposcd to any rcsistance to the Turks for they vverc only too happy to scc a Turkish take-over of the vvhole country. The Armenians, although fearful of such a possibility, vvere exhaustcd and disorganiscd and therefore not able to participate in any kind of opposition to the Turks. Finding themselves in such a desperate situalion and vvith the fear of complctc isolation, thc Gcorgians approachcd thc Gcrman General von Lossovv vvith a requcst for the protection from thc Turks. 41 Thc Gcrmans vvere interested in forcstalling thc advance of thc Turkish armics as they vvere sccking control of petrolcüm and other natural sources in the area for their ovvn benefit. The Gcorgian demand providcd an opportunity for the Gcrmans to set up a strong basis in the region to securc "thc ravv materials of the Caucasus indcpcndcntly of Turkey". 42 The representative of the Impcrial Chanccllor, Coloncl Krcss von Krcssentstcin, together vvith tvvo Gcrman officcrs and vvith a detaehment, arrived in Tiflis and cstablishcd an intimate relation vvith thc members of thc Gcorgian Diet.
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As a result of this guarantcc providcd by Gcrmany, thc Gcorgian Dict assembled in Tiflis and dcclarcd indcpcndcncc of Gcorgia on 26 May.
44 With Georgia's dcclaration of indepcndcncc, thc Transcaucasian Rcpublic, after only a month's cxistcncc, came to an cnd. Tvvo days after thc dcclaration of the indepcndcncc of Gcorgia, thc indcpcndcnl rcpublics of Armcnia and Azcrbaijan vvere dcclarcd, vvith Ercvan bcing thc Armcnian capital, and Gandzha (Elisavetpol) the Azerbaijani. 45 On 4 Junc, 1918, thc abovc three rcpublics signed three separate agreements vvith thc Ottoman Government at Batum, thus ending the Batum Confcrcncc. By thc trcaty of the Brest-Litovsk thc Ottoman Empirc had acquircd nearly 10,000 squarc miles and six-hundrcd-thousand inhabitants of Transcaucasia. As a result of thc Batum trcaty and additional 8,000 square Thc CIGS rcplicd General Marshall's telegram on 6 Junc saying ihat "vvithout furlhcr rcfcrcncc to London and definitive instruetions from thcrc" no step was lo bc taken. 62 Thc issuc was discussed in thc War Cabinct and thc Eastcrn Committcc. 63 Thc conclusion of thcsc discussions vvas thc same vvith thc CIGS's instruetions lo General Marshall: it vvas not desirable to send the British troops to Baku. 64 The reasons for this rcfusal vvere probably ihreefold. In thc first placc, thc Eastcrn Committcc fcared that once the troops had gone thcrc they vvould incvitably bc overvvhelmed by thc vasily morc numerous Turkish forccs. Sccond, Lord Curzon, ıhc Committcc's chairman, insisted on his collcagues that the foundalion of thcir policy had bccn lo build a barricr against the Turks in northern Pcrsia and if Dunstcrvillc iransfcrred any of his forccs lo Baku it vvas fcared that the Pcrsian barricr vvould be vveakcned. 65 Finally, Lloyd Gcorgc providcd thc ullimate and perhaps thc most significant rcason to vvhy thc British could and vvould not coopcratc vvith thc Bolsheviks. In a War Cabinct mccting in Junc hc stated that "it vvould bc better for us the Turks lo hold Baku", rathcr than ıhc "Russian Bear", since hc bclicvcd ihat "it vvas not probable they [the Turks] vvould ever be dangcrous to our [British] interests in thc East, vvhilsl, on thc othcr hand, Russia, if in the future shc becamc regenerated, might bc so".
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Intcrcsling enough, Moscovv's rcaction to the issuc of inviting thc British to help thc dcfcncc of Baku against the Turks vvas exactly thc samc as London's. Thc Bolshcvik govcrnmcnt rcfuscd to allovv Dunstcrvillc to pass unimpcndcd to Baku. Instcad of handing Baku to thc 'British imperialists', it vvas preferred to lcl ıhc Turks lo caplurc it. Similar to thc opinion in London, Moscovv bclicvcd ihat ıhc Turkish rulc in thc city vvould not bc permanent. Thc Baku Bolsheviks vvere urged to opposc catcgorically ıhc idca of inviting British troops for thc dcfence of ıhc city. Thc ollicial opposition bolh from London and Moscow, howcvcr, did not stop thcir local rcprcscntativcs to considcr such a coopcration and establish somc contacts. Goldsmith dcscribcs in his report that thc Baku Bolshcviks "aclually assistcd" thc Caucasus Military Agcncy "in prcvcnting food transports" by thc Gcrmans. In Vladikavkaz, too, thc Bolsheviks coopcrated with thc Caucasus Military Agency to chcck thc Gcrman and Turkish advancc in thc north Caucasus. Goldsmith providcs Russian and English copies of a dctailcd action plan preparcd by Coloncl Pike alongside with thc Vladikavkaz Bolsheviks. According to this the Gcorgian Military Road, together wilh thc railway station in Vladikavkaz, vvere controllcd by a combincd team of thc British and Bolshcviks "against thc Gcrman and Turkish agents..."
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In addition to Goldsmith's account Ronald MacDoncll, the British vice-consul in Baku, providcd somc cxtra confirmation of this in his pcrsonal account of thc events. According to MacDoncll thc lcadcr of thc Baku Bolshcviks, Shaumian, had a number of mcctings wiıh him in May and, although rcluctanıly, considcrcd to inviıc thc British forccs to Baku to hclp the city's dcfcnces. 69 There vvere other examples to thc cooperation bctvvcen thc local Bolshcviks and thc British. As a result of thc negotialions in Enzcli, Dunstervillc arranged vvitlı thc local Bolshcvik committcc to seli Ford cars to the Baku Sovict in exchangc for fucl. Fifly-lhousand pounds of gasoline vvas bought in return to ten Fords by thc end of July. 70 The barter of ten Ford cars vvith pclrolcum vvas citcd by Coloncl Ravvlinson as vvcll. Ravvlinson 
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On 16 July 1918, thc Dashnaks in thc Baku Sovict, this time together vvilh the SRs, put anothcr motion to cxtcnt an official invitation to thc British. The proposal vvas narrovvly dcfcatcd but it had rcccivcd so much support that Shaumian decidcd to ask for instruetions from thc Bolshcvik ccntral authoritics. Moscovv rcpcatcd its prcvious dccision, and ordered Shaumian lo combat Ihc Baku Sovict's "unpardonablc disposilion" to appcal for British aid. Wcrc Baku to fail, it vvould bc better that thc Ottoman Turks -not thc expcricnced English colonialists -bccomc thc temporary hcir to the invaluable city and its rcsourccs. 91 It is difficult to givc thc cxact number of the British troops vvho arrived in Baku in August. Dcspitc thc variation in thc quolcd number of men in various accounts, 92 it appcars that British forccs on thc ground had becn around onc-thousand men even by thc most cxaggcratcd account. This small forcc vvas totally inadcquatc even for thc purpose of compclling thc Turks to raise thc siege of Baku.
93 Dunstcrvillc attempted to strcngthcn the defcnce of thc city by commanding the units of thc Dashnaks, SRs and Mcnshcviks. Hc soon came to the conclusion that it vvas not rcalistic to proteet Baku unless cxtcnsivc mililary support was providcd. Yet none sccmcd forthcoming from anyvvhcrc. 94 In late August a glimpse of hope cmerged morc than a thousand miles away to savc Baku from thc invasion of thc Turkish armies. On 27 August, 1918, thc Gcrman-Soviet talks ended with an additional trcaty to thc BrestLitovsk. In this trcaty thc articlcs related to thc Caucasus proelaimed that Sovict Russia would not oppose Gcrman rccognition of Gcorgia, and that Russia would deliver to Germany ciıher onc-fourth of the petrolcüm tapped in Baku or a ccrtain monthly minimum to bc determined later. In return, Germany would refuse to assist thc military operations of a third powcr (Turkey) in arcas beyond thc borders of Gcorgia and, most importantly of ali, Germany would strive to prohibit a third povvcr from entering thc Baku region. 95 On papcr this supplcmcntary trcaty was a serious sctback to thc advancing Ottoman armics. Hovvcver, thc Gcrman troops in thc Caucasus vvere not cnough to stop thc Turks mililarily. Furthcrmorc, thc cxisting Gcrman troops and officcrs wcrc just callcd back due to "thc great efforts madc against us [the Gcrmans] on tlıe Frcnch front".
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Thc Turks wcre only 35 miles away from the city of Baku. In order to complcte a de facto situation thc 5th 15lh, and 36th divisions of the Caucasian Turkish army wcrc immcdiatcly ordered to strike rapidly. In thc facc of this strong Turkish attack, thc Gcrman military lcadcrs did not attempt to fulfil those rclcvant articlcs of thc Brest-Litovsk trcaty. Thcy did not deny thc Turkish troops' cntrancc to Baku and even thcy rccommcndcd that a small number of Gcrman units should participate in thc campaign in order to safcguard somc sharc for themselves. 97 earth can savc Baku from thc Turks. To continuc thc dcfcncc mcans only to dcfcr the evil moment and causc further nccdless loss of life." 99 London vvas informed about thc situation in Baku on 28 August. On 31 August thc War Office tclegraphcd in rcply cxprcssing entirc concurrcncc for a full vvithdravval. It vvas also suggcstcd that Dunstervillc should be instructed to dcstroy the oil-plantat Baku bcfore vvithdravval.
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When on 12 Scptembcr 'definite and reliable' information arrivcd (vvhich according to Dunstcrvillc by tvvo Arab deserters from thc Ottoman army and according to Ravvlinson by an Armcnian) about thc Turkish plans for thc final attack, Dunstcrvillc madc thc preparations for cvacuation.
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And on thc night of 14 Scptembcr, vvilh Baku under hcavy attack, Dunstcrvillc loadcd his men on ships and left thc city to its fate. Ravvlinson, on ıhc other hand, managed to load most of thc ammunition on to a liltle ship and left thc city vvilh largc quantilics of explosivcs. Dcspilc thc request of ıhc War Officc regarding thc Baku oil-plant no damagc had been done bcfore cvacuation, beyond pulling ıhc vvireless slation at Baku out of aetion.
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The same night the Turks broke through Baku's final dcfcnce parameler. Thc nexl day it vvas declarcd ihat the combincd TurkishAzerbaijani army capturcd Baku on behalf of thc Azerbaijani govcrnmcnt. 
